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Executive Summary
This report draws on two new surveys fielded in the spring 
and fall of 2009 that paint a comprehensive and sobering 
portrait of Americans’ experience with economic insecurity 
and their capacity to cope with economic instability. 
Collectively termed the Survey of Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity 
(SERPI), these surveys focus on four domains of economic life: employment, 
health care, family, and wealth. In each, they identify how often households 
experience various economic disruptions, how frequently those disruptions 
coincide across the four domains and persist over time, and what imprint 
those disruptions leave on Americans’ expectations, concerns, and ability to 
meet basic economic needs. Because parts of the survey were modeled after a 
separate 2007 poll, the SERPI also shows how Americans’ outlooks changed in 
response to the recent economic downturn.
These repeated snapshots convey a powerful picture of Americans standing on 
shaky ground, rocked by economic tremors whose consequences include not 
just worry and anxiety but severe economic hardship. Economic shocks were 
strikingly widespread in 2009.
n   In the 18 months from March 2008 to September 2009, fully 93 percent of 
households experienced at least one substantial decline in their wealth or 
earnings or substantial increase in nondiscretionary spending, most often for 
medical needs or assistance to family members. 
n   Nearly seven in ten households saw their earnings substantially fall or their 
nondiscretionary expenses substantially rise.
n   During this 18-month period, 23 percent of households reported a drop of at 
least a quarter of their annual household income. This confirms the findings 
of the Economic Security Index (ESI), an integrated measure of economic 
security based on publicly available statistics. Projections based on the ESI 
show that the share of Americans experiencing large income losses was 
higher in 2009 than at any point in the last quarter century.
Though intensified by the downturn, Americans’ economic insecurity has been 
growing for years, and it appears to have little diminished since 2009.
n   While public concerns about job security rose dramatically as the economy 
weakened, worries about other risks to economic security—debt, retirement 
savings, medical costs, health insurance, and even housing stability— were 
already as common in 2007 as they were in the depths of the recession.
n   According to separate opinion surveys, concerns about retirement savings and 
medical costs did not diminish at all between the summers of 2009 and 2010, 
and concerns about the job market declined only slightly.
2Economic instability leads not just to uncertainty but to anxiety and economic 
hardship. This hardship is experienced not just by those at the bottom of the 
economic ladder but also by those squarely in the middle class. 
n   By the spring of 2009, 78 percent of Americans were quite worried about at 
least one risk to their overall economic security.
n   Households experiencing major economic dislocations are, on average, three to 
four times more likely than otherwise comparable households to report being 
unable to meet multiple basic needs, such as food, shelter, and medical care. 
n   More than half of families with incomes between $60,000 and $100,000 that 
experience employment or medical disruptions report being unable to meet at 
least one basic economic need. 
n   Households with dependent children appear to be more at risk of 
experiencing problems in the face of economic instability than do households 
without children.
Looking forward, Americans appear extremely vulnerable to future economic 
shocks, in part because of the wearing down of their basic household “buffers” 
against economic risks, such as personal wealth and the potential to borrow 
from family and friends. 
n   By the fall of 2009, roughly three in ten Americans appeared highly vulnerable to 
additional shocks; perhaps as many as half appeared at least partially vulnerable, 
in the sense that their buffers against economic instability were limited. 
n   Buffers against economic instability are eroded by persisting and clustered 
economic shocks, depleting the security of even previously prepared 
economic households.
n   While economic shocks are broad-based, the private buffers that households 
have against economic risks are much weaker for less affluent and less 
educated households than for higher-income and well-educated households. 
Economic instability is so disruptive because shocks frequently persist over 
time, come clustered together, and occur at roughly the same time in multiple 
domains (employment, health care, family, and wealth).
n   About half of all the economic shocks experienced in 2008 reoccured in the 
same households in 2009; these “persisting” shocks are associated with higher 
levels of unmet need.
n   In a given domain, households often experienced repeated shocks in close 
succession. For example, more than a third of households that experienced a 
shock in employment or medical expenses experienced multiple shocks in the 
same area.
n   Of those Americans who reported persisting disruptions of employment, 
three-quarters also experienced persisting shocks in at least one of the other 
three domains of economic life.
economic security project
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Yet strikingly little is known about how Americans perceive their economic 
security, how those perceptions relate to their economic experiences, or how 
experienced instability affects households, well-being. 
This report fills this gap. It draws on two new surveys fielded in the spring and 
fall of 2009, collectively termed the Survey of Economic Risk Perceptions and 
Insecurity (SERPI). The SERPI focuses on four major domains of Americans’ 
economic lives: (1) employment; (2) wealth (housing, retirement savings, and 
other asset holdings); (3) health care; and (4) families. 
In each area, the SERPI examines not just the economic “shocks” that 
Americans experienced—whether loss of resources or increases in 
nondiscretionary spending, such as medical costs—but also the effects of those 
shocks on Americans’ lives, expectations, and concerns for the future. Because 
parts of the survey were modeled after a poll on economic security conducted 
just before the downturn, the SERPI also shows how Americans’ outlooks 
changed in response to the recession. 
As suggested by the title of this report, many Americans are—and see 
themselves to be—standing on shaky ground. The recent economic downturn 
represented an especially powerful quake, emanating from two distinctive 
epicenters: declining employment and disrupted financial markets. Yet 
Americans faced jarring economic shocks even before the downturn, and 
continue to do so today. The SERPI and related evidence suggest that economic 
insecurity has become  the rule, not the exception, for many Americans—even 
in good times. 
Economic shocks, like an earthquake, do not consist of a single tremor. 
Households experiencing an economic shock are also more likely to 
experience that same shock again in the near future, to face other shocks in 
the same domain, and to be hit simultaneously by shocks in other domains. This 
persistence and clustering means that even the most prudent households can lose 
their financial footing. Although poor households are most vulnerable because 
they often lack the financial resources to buffer economic disruptions, the security 
and well-being of even more affluent households are at risk.  
The damage is often severe. Households experiencing major economic 
dislocations are, on average, three to four times more likely than otherwise 
comparable households to report being unable to meet multiple basic needs, 
such as food, shelter, and medical care. Strikingly, these effects are not limited 
Standing on Shaky Ground
americans’ experiences with 
economic insecurity
Three years after the onset of the recession, public concerns  
about the economy remain high.
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to those at the bottom end of the income distribution: more than half of 
families with incomes between $60,000 and $100,000 that experience persisting 
medical or employment shocks report being unable to meet at least one basic 
economic need. 
This pattern of repeated shocks underscores how crucial basic safeguards 
against economic insecurity are. Yet the SERPI suggests that Americans are 
not adequately protected against future economic instability. By the fall of 
2009, between a third and a half of all Americans appeared vulnerable to future 
instability, in that  they lacked substantial financial reserves, could not pay off 
their current debt, and/or believed they could not borrow more than $5,000 
from family and friends. This is in part the result of past instability: households 
facing repeated economic shocks are about twice as likely to report having 
inadequate buffers to deal with future economic uncertainties. 
The remainder of this report lays out the basis for these conclusions, starting 
with a description of the survey. The first part of the report examines the main 
dimensions of American economic security: how often families experience 
shocks; how they perceive the economic risks they face, including whether and 
when they feel anxiety about them; and how these shocks affect their economic 
well-being. The second part of the report considers how these experiences 
and perceptions differ across major socio-demographic groups in American 
society. The concluding section takes stock of these findings and considers their 
implications.
The Survey of Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity 
Long before the onset of the recent downturn, Americans worried about the 
stability of their finances. Yet surveys assessing Americans’ perceptions of 
economic security were both rare and limited in scope. Although researchers 
documented varied forms of increasing economic risk, efforts to assess public 
views and experiences were quite narrow and focused almost entirely on risks 
related to job loss.1 Recent surveys have filled in some of the gaps, but they 
too have generally asked questions about only one or two domains of risk.2  
More important, these assessments of public attitudes have looked almost 
exclusively at Americans’ expressed worries, with little attention to their actual 
experiences or to their capacity to buffer economic shocks. 3 
 
The SERPI in Brief
The Survey of Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity was designed to 
fill this void. Fielded twice in 2009, it measured a wide range of events and 
perceptions that could leave families feeling insecure, focusing on four broad 
domains: employment, medical care, wealth, and familial arrangements.4 
The survey gauged Americans’ worries using a consistent set of questions that 
allows for comparison and ranking within and across these areas, as well as 
over time. The survey also included an extensive set of questions about people’s 
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encounters with unstable economic 
circumstances in both the recent and 
the more distant past. Another cluster 
of questions measured the capacity of 
households to safeguard themselves 
against economic risks or to buffer the 
financial shocks that they experience. 
Yet another set of questions assessed 
both the psychological consequences 
of insecurity and its relationship to 
households’ ability to meet basic needs 
involving food, housing, and essential 
medical care. 
The SERPI was incorporated as an 
independent part of the 2008–2009 Panel 
Survey of the American National Election 
Studies, a survey funded by the National 
Science Foundation for the past half 
century. Panel surveys interview the same 
individuals repeatedly over time. With 
the financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation, the SERPI was fielded as 
the sole questionnaire for the ANES panel in March (Wave 15) and September 
(Wave 21) of 2009. The panel was constructed to provide a representative 
sample of the American population aged 18 and older as of November 4, 2008.5 
Data collected on economic experiences, perceptions, and expectations during 
these two waves were merged with socio-demographic and other personal 
characteristics collected from respondents in other waves of the survey.
Ensuring Comparable, Accurate Measures of Perceptions
To allow comparison of pre- and post-recession responses, parts of the SERPI 
were modeled after a poll sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation in the 
spring of 2007. The core of this 2007 survey was a question about “your family’s 
economic security” defined in general terms.6 The survey also asked about 
concerns related to more specific economic risks, including losing one’s job, 
facing large out-of-pocket medical spending, and lacking adequate income to 
pay for a comfortable and secure retirement.7 All told, the survey asked about 
fifteen distinct economic risks. In each case, respondents were asked if they 
were “very,” “fairly,” “somewhat,” or “not at all” worried about each risk.8
To assess the frequency with which worries coincided with bad experiences, 
a matched set of questions was asked about  respondents’ experiences with 
economic instability (referred to below as “experiencing an economic shock”).  
For example, worries about employment were matched with questions regarding 
whether any adults in the household had lost their jobs. Respondents in the 
March 2009 SERPI were asked about whether they had experienced the event 
The SERPI was designed to complement 
the Economic Security Index (ESI), an 
integrated measure of economic security 
based on publicly available statistics. The 
ESI represents the share of Americans who 
experience a 25 percent or greater year-to-
year decline in their available household 
resources—their income minus their medical 
costs and debt service—and who lack an 
adequate financial safety net to cushion the 
fall. According to the ESI, economic insecurity 
has worsened since the mid-1980s, with a 
projected one-in-five Americans experiencing 
25 percent or greater losses in 2009. Yet the 
ESI provides limited information about the 
dimensions and causes of these large losses, 
or how Americans subjectively perceive these 
objective economic events—all of which the 
SERPI uniquely illuminates. For more on the 
ESI, visit economicsecurityindex.org.
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in the prior twelve months, and those responding on the September 2009 wave 
were asked if they had experienced the event in the past six months. For 
those completing both waves of the survey, therefore, the SERPI provides a 
unique 18-month history from March 2008 to September 2009 of Americans’ 
experiences with economic risks during the recession. The appendix to this 
report describes the survey in greater detail and discusses some of the more 
technical issues raised by its implementation and interpretation.
Americans’ Experiences of Economic Insecurity
Almost every American’s economic security was disrupted in the 18 months 
between March 2008 and September 2009. These disruptions are evident in the 
frequency, character, and consequences of the economic shocks experienced  
by American households.
Economic Instability Touches Almost Every American 
The SERPI included measures of eleven distinct shocks related to household 
earnings or nondiscretionary spending (see text box). During the 18 months 
preceding the fall of 2009, over 90 percent of respondents reported experiencing 
at least one shock in the domain of employment (two measures), wealth (three 
measures), health (three measures), or the family (three measures). While 
it is not surprising that the simultaneous downturn in the housing and stock 
markets destabilized wealth for  many Americans who might otherwise have felt 
secure, almost seven in ten (68 percent) of all Americans experienced a shock 
related to domains other than wealth, either an unexpected loss of earnings or 
an increase in nondiscretionary spending. 
These shocks were often quite substantial. During these 18 months, almost a 
quarter of all households reported a decline in earnings totaling 25 percent or 
more of annual income. This confirms the findings of the Economic Security 
Economic Shocks Measured by the SERPI
Employment
n   unemployed not by personal 
choice (respondent or immediate 
family member)
n   lost more than a month of work 
due to serious illness or injury
Health Care
n  lost health insurance 
n   major out-of-pocket medical 
expenses as the result of serious 
illness or injury (respondent or 
immediate family member)
n   paid a lot more for health 
insurance than expected
Wealth
n   retirement benefits at work cut 
substantially
n   value of investments or retirement 
funds declined substantially
n   value of house declined 
substantially
Family
n   divorced or separated from 
spouse
n   spent a substantial sum helping 
out extended family
n   spouse/partner passed away
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index, an integrated measure of economic security based on publicly available 
statistics that suggests that the share of Americans experiencing large income 
losses was higher in 2009 than at any point in the last quarter century. (For more 
information, see the prior report in this series, “Economic Security at Risk: 
Findings from the Economic Security Index,” July 2010.)
As Figure 1 shows, the most common form of economic disruption involved 
losses of household wealth, which were experienced by more than three-
quarters of all households. Shocks related to medical costs were the second 
most common, experienced by about half of all households. A third of all 
households reported some disruption of employment; shocks caused by family 
needs were about as frequent. 
Economic Shocks Often Persist over Time
Economic shocks may be isolated—a one-time or infrequent event in a family’s 
life. However, once experienced, a shock may reoccur persistently over time or 
coincide with other economic shocks. Because the SERPI assessed experiences 
at two points in time, it is possible to determine the proportion of those who 
experienced a shock in the year prior to March 2009 who also reported that 
same shock in the subsequent six months. 
As it turns out, such “persisting” shocks are close to the norm among those 
experiencing an economic shock: About half of all respondents who experienced 
Fig. 1  Prevalance of Economic Shocks
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a shock in the first year reported that it reoccurred in the next six months. 
Persisting shocks are most common in the wealth domain and least common in 
the family domain. As documented below, persisting shocks are more likely to 
produce negative effects for the households that experience them. 
Multiple Shocks Are Common
Many households experience multiple shocks in the same domain. As Figure 
2 shows, these are most common for declines in wealth: More than half of all 
Americans who experienced at least one wealth shock (such as a decline in 
stock value) reported other wealth shocks (such as declines in housing value 
and reduced retirement benefits) over the same time period. A multiplicity of 
shocks is least common for family disruption (only 10 percent who experienced 
a family shock reported multiple shocks). Employment and medical domains 
fall in between these extremes.
The most frequent form of clustering, however, occurs across risk domains 
rather than within them. Figure 3 indicates that households experiencing 
economic instability in one domain more often than not also experience shocks 
in other domains at the same time. For instance, almost three in four Americans 
who experienced a persisting shock to employment between the beginning of 
Fig. 3  Persisting Shocks across Domains
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2008 and the fall of 2009 also reported a persisting shock in one of the other 
domains (wealth, health, and family), and often in several of them at once. About 
a third of those with persisting employment shocks experienced a persisting 
shock in just one of the other three domains. But almost half (44 percent) 
experienced persisting shocks in three or more domains over these 18 months. 
As these figures reveal, Americans’ lives are not simply disrupted by the 
occasional unfortunate happenstance. Many experience a series of economic 
shocks, the combined impact of which is much larger than any of the individual 
shocks. When economic shocks both cluster and persist, the lives of even 
the most prudent and careful households can be deeply disrupted and those 
households’ expectations for the future can be 
profoundly unsettled.
Widespread Worries about Economic 
Insecurity
The deep economic downturn of 2009 gave rise 
to widespread concerns among Americans. Prior 
to the onset of the recession, about half of the 
American public worried somewhat about their 
economic security considered in the most general 
terms, with a quarter “very” or “fairly” worried. By the spring of 2009, more than 
half (53 percent) of all Americans were very or fairly worried, with only about 
one in ten “not at all” concerned. By the fall, concerns had slightly abated as 
the public grew more sanguine about the stock market and the viability of their 
plans for retirement. 
figure 4
Americans’ lives are not 
simply disrupted by the 
occasional unfortunate 
happenstance. Many 
experience a series of 
economic shocks.
Fig. 4  Rising concerns About Economic Insecurity
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Just as the recession amplified general concerns about economic security, it 
also intensified worries about job loss. Employment concerns rose dramatically 
as the unemployment rate rose from 4.5 percent in the spring of 2007 to 9.3 
percent in the spring of 2009.  
Yet worries about a host of other risks to economic security—debt, retirement 
savings, medical costs, health insurance, and even housing stability—increased 
more modestly between 2007 and 2009. More than 40 percent of Americans, for 
example, were already very or fairly worried about “having enough money to 
retire on” prior to the onset of the recession. The share very or fairly worried 
about medical costs and health insurance also remained relatively stable 
(and, in the case of health insurance, the share very worried actually dropped 
between 2007 and 2009). In these areas, concerns were already notably high 
before the downturn. 
What Sources of Economic Instability Cause the Most Worry?
The SERPI provides a more comprehensive portrait of economic concerns in 
2009. Looking across the 15 different sources of potential worry, more than 
three-quarters of all Americans reported that they were very or fairly worried 
about at least one of these economic risks. Worries about wealth were the most 
frequent cause of economic unease, though concerns about medical costs were 
a close second. 
 
Perhaps the most surprising finding is the prevalence of worries related 
to the family. While employment concerns have received considerable 
attention, insecurity related to the family realm is largely absent from the 
agenda of the media and public officials. Yet Americans worry about family-
induced insecurities roughly as much as they worry about insecurities due to 
Fig. 5  Scope of Concerns about Economic Security
Spring 2009
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employment: In the midst of a 
dramatic economic downturn  
about 39 percent of Americans 
reported being very or fairly 
worried about losing their job  
(or, if out of work, finding 
employment) —almost exactly the 
same proportion who reported 
being very of fairly worried about 
losing their spouse/partner. 
In light of the recent debate 
over health care reform, it is not 
surprising that Americans were 
deeply worried about unstable 
insurance enrollment, rising 
premiums, and gaps in coverage. Yet during that debate, there was remarkably 
little public discussion of the financial effects of time away from work due 
to illness. Thus it is striking that about a third of the public was very or fairly 
worried about losing several months of earnings due to an extended illness. 
Worries about forgone income due to illness are just slightly less common than 
concerns about losing one’s job and just as prevalent as concerns about losing 
one’s health insurance.9
Are Americans’ Worries Reasonable?
Comparing the prevalence of worries and the frequency of shocks, Americans 
appear to accurately assess the likelihood of some common risks. In the domain 
of employment, for example, the frequency of shocks and the proportion of the 
public worried about these events match relatively 
closely. However, this close match does not hold 
for all shocks. About as many Americans worry 
about losing their partner or spouse as about 
substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses, and 
many more do so than are worried about needing 
to assist family members in financial need. Yet 
divorce or death of a spouse or partner is actually 
far less common than either of these latter sources 
of nondiscretionary spending. Similarly, worries 
about losing insurance coverage are almost as 
common as are worries about high out-of-pocket 
medical spending. Yet losses of insurance coverage 
actually occur only about half as often as do high out-of-pocket medical costs.
These divergences may reflect the public’s misperception of certain risks. 
People tend to inflate the chance of unpredictable events that induce great 
fear or anxiety.10 Yet the heightened worry associated with certain risks may 
also reflect the expected severity of the resulting economic losses. An intuitive 
Worries about forgone 
income due to illness are 
just slightly less common 
than concerns about 
losing one’s job and just 
as prevalent as concerns 
about losing one’s health 
insurance.
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measure of expected severity is the estimated length of time it takes for a 
household’s financial circumstances to return to the level enjoyed before the 
event occurred. When asked to estimate how long recovery would typically 
take, Americans predicted that family disruptions (death of spouse or divorce) 
would have the longest-lasting consequences, with nearly eight in ten (78 
percent) saying it would take more than six months to recover economically. 
The consequences of illness (either out-of-pocket spending or time lost from 
work) came close in terms of their anticipated duration. Unemployment and 
investment losses, by contrast, were seen as having the most transitory effects.11 
Substantial Anxiety about Economic Insecurity
While the previous measures concern people’s worries about economic 
insecurity, worries may not affect the quality of individuals’ lives substantially. 
Thinking about negative events is rarely pleasant, but worries are not always 
associated with intense negative feelings.12 Extreme anxiety, by contrast, can 
induce physiological stress responses. If anxiety is chronic, these stressors can 
lead to declines in both physical and mental health.13
According to the spring and fall 2009 waves of the 
SERPI, roughly 17 to 19 percent of the public reported 
themselves to be very or extremely anxious on each 
wave of the survey when thinking about economic 
insecurity. A total of 28 percent of all Americans were 
either very or extremely anxious about their economic 
prospects on at least one of the two surveys; 9 percent 
had persisting high anxiety across both surveys. 
Not surprisingly, those who were most worried about 
specific forms of economic uncertainty proved to be 
most anxious as well: Of those who reported themselves to be very worried 
about unstable employment, medical costs, fluctuating wealth, or family-related 
shocks, roughly 40 percent were very or extremely anxious about economic 
insecurity. By contrast, among those who reported no intense worries about 
these specific economic risks, less than 2 percent felt intense anxiety about 
economic insecurity. 
A similar pattern is evident for those who experienced shocks, as is evident 
in Figure 6. Among the households that had been free of any of the eleven 
shocks measured in the SERPI, only about 5 percent reported themselves to 
be very or extremely anxious. Among households that had experienced one or 
more shocks, the frequency of this intense anxiety jumped to between 15 and 
25 percent depending on the domain of risk. And for all four domains, when 
households experienced shocks that persisted across the two time periods 
in the survey, they reported even more extreme anxiety. After experiencing 
persisting shocks unrelated to wealth, about a third of all Americans reported 
themselves to be very or extremely anxious about economic uncertainty. 
A total of 28 percent of all 
Americans were either very 
or extremely anxious about 
their economic prospects 
on at least one of the two 
surveys.
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The Impact of Insecurity on  Economic Well-Being
The frequency of anxiety and the degree to which it occurs in tandem with 
economic shocks strongly suggest that Americans fear the potentially serious 
economic dislocations these shocks create. The SERPI allows us to examine 
this implication more directly. A series of questions prompted respondents 
to indicate if they or members of their household had unmet needs for food, 
housing stability, or medical care—for example if they had gone hungry, lost 
their home, or failed to see a doctor (see the Technical Appendix for the specific 
questions asked). Because these unmet needs are measured on each wave of 
the survey, respondents could report up to six unmet basic needs over the 18 
months covered by the SERPI.
Economic Shocks Are Associated with Unmet Needs
Some households that have not experienced any economic shocks nonetheless 
report unmet needs, because their earnings are modest and savings are limited.  
Indeed, roughly one in five households that have experienced no economic 
instability (no shocks in the past 18 months) still report having at least one 
unmet basic need.14 But households that have experienced economic shocks—
especially persisting shocks—report much higher levels of unmet need. As 
Figure 7 shows, this is particularly true of employment and medical shocks: 
Fig. 6  Economic Shocks and Anxiety about Economic Instability
2008–2009
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Fig. 7  Economic Shocks and Unmet Basic Needs
2008–2009
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Shocks to wealth and family are associated with a doubli g of households 
reporting any unmet need and a fivefold increase in households reporting 
multiple unmet needs, whereas shocks to employment and medical spending 
are associated with a tripling of households reporting any unmet needs and a 
sevenfold increase in the proportion of households reporting multiple unmet 
needs. For the most part, then, basic needs seem to be far more threatened 
by disruptions of employment or by unexpected medical spending than by 
emergencies in the family or by unanticipated drops in wealth.15
Are the Effects of Insecurity Distinct from Economic Disadvantage?
Households that report unstable economic circumstances are far more likely 
to experience both heightened anxiety and unmet needs. But families that face 
unstable economic circumstances might have other attributes that make them 
vulnerable to these bad outcomes as well—most notably, lower incomes. Less 
affluent households are more likely to have unmet needs and also to have less 
stable employment and less comprehensive health insurance. Thus, it is crucial 
to examine whether economic insecurity is independently associated with 
hardship, even after household income is taken into account.
To do that, it is helpful to group respondents into household income quartiles—
four equally sized groups ranked from poorest to richest. Comparing within 
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each quartile, it becomes clear that even among the top 25 percent of 
Americans—and, indeed, within every income quartile—economic instability is 
associated with an increased level of unmet basic needs (Figure 8). A quarter 
of families in the lowest income quartile (those with annual incomes of less 
than $35,000) reported some unmet needs even if they had experienced no 
economic instability in the previous 18 months. But among those that had faced 
economic instability, unmet needs were far more common. Among those who 
had experienced persisting employment shocks, for example, almost 90 percent 
reported some unmet basic needs, and 56 percent reported multiple unmet 
needs. 
Strikingly, the same relationship holds among families in the third quartile of 
household income (annual incomes between $60,000 and $100,000). Among 
those that experienced no economic instability, unmet basic needs were about 
half as common as in the lowest income quartile, reported by about 12 percent 
of all households. For those who encountered persisting economic shocks, 
the level of unmet needs was far more common—strikingly so, considering 
that these households are relatively well-off. About half of households in this 
quartile that had experienced persisting shocks to employment or medical costs 
reported some unmet need; almost 40 percent reported multiple unmet needs. 
Even among solidly middle-class families, in short, economic instability is 
associated with much higher levels of unmet basic needs.
Fig. 8  Unmet Needs Associated with Economic Instability,
for Selected Income Strata
         
     
Unmet Needs Associated with Economic Instability,
For Selected Income Strata
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
A
ll
A
ll
A
ll
A
ll
A
t  oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
A
t  oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
A
t  oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
A
t  oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
 
t 
Sh
s 
Sh  S
h
 S
h
oc
ks
 
t 
Sh
s 
Sh  S
h
 S
h
oc
ks
 
t 
Sh
s 
Sh  S
h
 S
h
oc
ks
 
t 
Sh
s 
Sh  S
h
 S
h
Sh m
en
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
Sh m
en
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
Sh m
en
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
Sh m
en
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
N
o  lo
y  
 W
e
 
N
o  lo
y  
 W
e
 
N
o  lo
y  
 W
e
 
N
o  lo
y  
 W
e
 
m
p
M
ed
ic
al
ti
ng
is
ti
ng
m
p
M
ed
ic
al
ti
ng
is
ti
ng
m
p
M
ed
ic
al
ti
ng
is
ti
ng
m
p
M
ed
ic
al
ti
ng
is
ti
ng
g 
E
  rs
is
Pe
rs g 
E
  rs
is
Pe
rs g 
E
  rs
is
Pe
rs g 
E
  rs
is
Pe
rs
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t 
A
ll
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
 S
ho
ck
s
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 W
ea
lt
h 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 F
am
ily
 S
ho
ck
s
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t 
A
ll
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
 S
ho
ck
s
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 W
ea
lt
h 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 F
am
ily
 S
ho
ck
s
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t 
A
ll
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
 S
ho
ck
s
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 W
ea
lt
h 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 F
am
ily
 S
ho
ck
s
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t 
A
ll
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
 S
ho
ck
s
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 W
ea
lt
h 
Sh
oc
ks
Pe
rs
is
ti
ng
 F
am
ily
 S
ho
ck
s
Lowest Income Quartile Second Quartile Third Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile
Multiple Unmet Needs One Unmet Need
         
     
Unmet Needs Associated with Economic Instability,
For Selected Inc me Strata
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Al
l
nt s Al
l
nt s Al
l
nt s nt s
At
  e
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
At
  e
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
At
  e
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
 A
ll* e
Co
st al
th
Fa
m
ily
oc
ks
 
pl
oy
m  
 W
e
 
oc
ks
 
pl
oy
m  
 W
e
 
oc
ks
 
pl
oy
m  
 W
e
   A
t
pl
oy
m  
 W
e
 
Sh Em M
ed
ic
al
oc
ks
oc
ks
Sh Em M
ed
ic
al
oc
ks
oc
ks
Sh Em M
ed
ic
al
oc
ks
oc
ks
oc
ks
Em M
ed
ic
al
oc
ks
oc
ks
N
o 
oc
ks
     S
h  S
h
N
o 
oc
ks
     S
h  S
h
N
o 
oc
ks
     S
h  S
h
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
     S
h  S
h
Sh o
ck
s
tin
g
is
tin
g
Sh o
ck
s
tin
g
is
tin
g
Sh o
ck
s
tin
g
is
tin
g
Sh o
ck
s
tin
g
is
tin
g
g   S
h
rs
is
Pe
rs g   S
h
rs
is
Pe
rs g   S
h
rs
is
Pe
rs g   S
h
rs
is
Pe
rs
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
si
st
in
st
in
g
Pe
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t A
ll
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 W
ea
lth
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 F
am
ily
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t A
ll
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 W
ea
lth
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 F
am
ily
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t A
ll
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 W
ea
lth
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 F
am
ily
N
o 
Sh
oc
ks
 A
t A
ll*
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 M
ed
ic
al
 C
os
ts
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 W
ea
lth
Pe
rs
is
tin
g 
Sh
oc
ks
 F
am
ily
Lowest Income Quartile Second Quartile Third Income Quartile Highest Income Quartile
Multiple Unmet Needs One Unmet Need
* No respondents in this income strata reported unmet needs in the absence of economic shocks 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 R
ep
or
ti
ng
 U
nm
et
 N
ee
ds
*  
16 economic security project
Three to six months
EXHIBIT 14
Time Without Income 
Before Hardship 
Less than a week 9.0%
One to two weeks 10.4%
Three to four weeks 9.2%
O t t th 18 7%ne o wo mon s .
Three to four months 14.5% Less than two weeks
Five to six months 8.9% Three to four weeks
Six months or more 29.3% One to two months
Time Without Income 
Before Hardship  Six months or more
Less than two weeks 19.4%
Three to four weeks 9.2%
One to two months 18.7%
Three to six months 23.4%
Six months or more 29.3%
Incomplete Buffers against the Impact of Economic Shocks
The impact of some economic shocks, such as high health care costs and partial 
disability from work, can be lessened by purchasing insurance. Others, such as 
unemployment and a complete inability to work, are at least partially insured by 
public policies. But for many risks (including loss of a spouse, declining value 
of investments, urgent financial assistance to one’s extended family, and lost 
earnings apart from formal unemployment or disability), insurance protection is 
generally either unavailable or beyond the means of the average citizen. 
Households can guard against uninsured or partially insured risks only by 
saving, borrowing from family and friends, or drawing on the equity of their 
assets, such as their home or retirement account. The SERPI included several 
questions about these informal risk buffers.16 
At the core of these measures is the household’s self-assessed capacity to get 
by without hardship should their income be interrupted for an extended length 
of time. As Figure 9 shows, just over 29 percent of Americans reported that 
their household could go six months or longer without experiencing hardship 
if their earnings were to stop tomorrow. Yet nearly half of households could go 
no longer than two months without hardship setting in; one in five could last no 
more than two weeks. If the capacity to go at least three months without income 
is treated as a threshold of adequate reserves (recall that almost a quarter of 
all household experienced a drop of 25 percent or more in their annual income 
in the 18 months preceding the fall of 2009), then more than half the American 
population appears to lack adequate buffers.
Three additional measures of buffers in the SERPI are related to the capacity to 
borrow: in financial markets (i.e., taking out a loan), drawing against equity (i.e., 
home equity loans), and through more informal mechanisms (i.e., from family 
and friends). Combined with our measure of financial reserves, these offer a 
multifaceted assessment of the ability of households to deal with unexpected 
economic shocks. In the aggregate, they do not make Americans appear much 
Fig. 9  How Long Can Household Go without Income
Before Hardship Sets In?
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One to two weeks 10.4%
Three to four weeks 9.2%
O t t th 18 7%ne o wo mon s .
Three to four months 14.5% Less than two weeks
Five to six months 8.9% Three to fo r  eks
Six months or more 29.3% One to two months
Time Without Income 
Before Hardship  Six months or more
Less than two weeks 19.4%
Three to four weeks 9.2%
One to two months 18.7%
Three to six months 23.4%
Six months or more 29.3%
17standing on shaky ground
more secure. To be sure, about a 
third of respondents anticipated 
that they could borrow $5,000 
or more from family or friends if 
facing some urgent financial need. 
However, 44 percent expected not 
to be able to borrow at all, and one 
in five considered themselves to be 
so deep in debt that they doubted 
that they could ever pay it off. 
Why Household Buffers  
Are Weak
Why does such a large share of 
households have limited savings, 
high levels of debt, and limited 
capacity to borrow in times of need 
from friends and family? Although 
some Americans lack foresight or prudence, two other causes also come into 
play: prior economic shocks and a basic lack of resources. Households’ buffers 
are frequently depleted by shocks to earnings or nondiscretionary spending. 
Comparing respondents who experienced a drop in income or loss of wealth 
between the first and second waves of the survey (and had not experienced 
a prior shock), those that did not experience an 
economic shock between the two surveys saw a 
modest improvement in their risk buffers over the 
intervening six months. By contrast, those who did 
experience a shock reported degradation in all four 
measures of buffer resilience.  
Lack of buffers is also strongly associated with 
economic disadvantage, suggesting that resource 
constraints are one important reason why some 
families are ill-prepared against economic risks. 
Understanding why such a large share of households have limited economic 
buffers thus requires examining more closely who is most likely to experience 
economic shocks without adequate protections—the question taken up in the 
next section. 
The Uneven Experience of Economic Insecurity
The SERPI documents that insecurity and instability are commonplace in 
Americans’ economic lives, with consequences that are frequently severe for 
even middle-class families. Nonetheless, the experience of insecurity varies 
substantially across American society—across income and educational groups, 
family types, and other important demographic characteristics. This is not 
Nearly half of households 
could go no longer than two 
months without hardship 
setting in. One in five could 
last no more than two 
weeks.
18 economic security project
simply because the chance of major economic shocks (and especially clusters 
of major shocks) is different for these various groups. The greatest disparities 
in the experience of economic instability emerge when we consider the ways in 
which households differ in their capacity to buffer  the shocks that occur. 
The Surprising Commonality of Economic Instability
During the recession, differences in exposure to economic disruptions were 
remarkably modest, as Figure 10 suggests. Even putting aside wealth losses—
which are, not surprisingly, more frequent among more affluent Americans—
middle-income and well-educated Americans often experienced major 
economic shocks. Employment-related instability was less frequent for more 
advantaged Americans, but job loss was sufficiently common that it presented 
a realistic and not uncommon worry: 16 percent of college graduates and 19 
Fig. 10  Shocks and Worries by Sociodemographic Groups
Education
Race/Ethnicity
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20 economic security project
percent of households in the highest income quartile reported themselves to 
be very worried about at least one threat to continued employment. Economic 
uncertainty in other domains—notably, medical care—was even more common: 
About a quarter of the most economically advantaged households reported 
themselves to be very worried about these risks. 
No group in American society appears fully insulated from economic instability. 
Among college graduates, for example, more than 63 percent experienced 
persisting shocks to their wealth, almost 21 percent experienced persisting 
shocks due to medical costs, more than 12 percent experienced persisting 
shocks due to employment instability, and 11 percent experienced family-
related persisting shocks. By comparison, the prevalence of persisting shocks 
among households headed by those with, at most, a high school degree was 
more than 45 percent for wealth shocks, nearly 26 percent for medical shocks, 
nearly 24 percent for employment shocks, and just over 13 percent for family-
related shocks—higher for every category but wealth, but only modestly so for 
every domain but employment.
Starker Disparities in the Strength of Buffers
While exposure to risk during the recession did not vary as dramatically as 
might be supposed, the strength of protections against those risks did. Thus the 
significance of the uneven exposure to economic risks depends in large part on 
the distribution of “buffers” against economic risks—insurance, savings, family 
risk-sharing, and other resources that can be tapped in response to economic 
instability. 
We might expect that those whose lives are most affected by economic 
turbulence would have the greatest incentive to prepare. What the SERPI 
shows, however, is that those households that have the weakest buffers also 
face the greatest risk. Because these risks are concentrated among households 
Fig. 11  Uneven Financial Buffers against Economic Uncertainy
Socio-Economic Status, 2009
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21standing on shaky ground
that have faced longstanding economic disadvantages, households face serious 
constraints in preparing against economic dislocations. 
Which Americans are better prepared to cope with risks because they can 
buffer them? Some of the differences charted in Figure 11 are unsurprising: 
Risk buffers are more resilient for households with advantaged socio-economic 
characteristics, whether measured in terms of educational attainment or 
household income. 
Family Composition, 2009
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22 economic security project
Other patterns, however, are less predictable. Although African-Americans 
and Latinos have roughly similar economic circumstances, risk buffers for 
the former are distinctly weaker, particularly the balance between debt and 
financial reserves and the very limited capacity to borrow from family and 
friends—a difference that has been identified in prior research for wealth 
holding, but not for these other forms of risk buffers.17 
Also noteworthy is that households with children appear to be less adequately 
buffered against risk than do other households. Their greater capacity to 
borrow from family and friends appears more than offset by weaknesses 
evident in the other three measures of buffer resiliency.
The Unequal Consequences of Economic Insecurity
How do unequal exposure to and protections against economic risk influence 
households’ financial well-being? Figure 12 tells the story. Because respondents 
from higher socio-economic status are both (modestly) less likely to experience 
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shocks that might induce unmet needs and (substantially) more capable 
of buffering those shocks when they occur, the consequences of economic 
shocks for economic well-being are notably more negative for less advantaged 
Americans, measured in terms of education. 
Differences by race and ethnicity are also striking. Given that African-Americans 
have more risk exposure and less resilient buffers, it is not surprising that they 
report very high levels of unmet needs when they experience economic shocks. 
Latinos report comparable levels of unmet needs, and both groups report much 
higher levels of unmet needs than whites. Yet, 
more surprising, Latinos who do not experience 
economic shocks report lower levels of unmet 
needs than either African-Americans or whites. 
Family composition has mixed implications. On 
the one hand, two-adult households are much less 
likely to experience unmet needs when they face 
no economic instability. On the other hand, among households experiencing 
economic shocks, the gap in unmet needs between single- and multiple- adult 
households is much smaller. This may partly reflect the higher baseline level of 
unmet needs for single adults, but it suggests, at a minimum, that multiple adult 
households are powerfully affected by shocks. This is in large part because 
many of these shocks are transmitted through employment; multi-worker 
households thus get doubly exposed to unemployment, benefit cuts and the 
like, even though their dual-earner capacity also allows them to more readily 
buffer some of these shocks. 
The presence of children in the household yields a more consistent pattern. 
Although households with children report modestly greater unmet needs 
compared to childless households when there is no economic instability, both 
Households with children 
appear to be less adequately 
buffered against risk than 
do other households.
Fig. 12  Unmet Needs by Family Composition
(With and Without Shocks)
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differentials get strikingly larger when the households experience economic 
shocks. The gap in unmet needs between households with children and without 
children grows by 10 percentage points in the face of economic instability and 
appears equally large whether the shocks involve wealth or other risk domains. 
It remains unclear why households with children are less capable of coping 
with economic uncertainty. Children themselves can be a source of unexpected 
costs. In addition, adults in households with children may be constrained by 
child care or other responsibilities, limiting their ability to adapt to shifting 
work expectations, medical needs, or other changing circumstances. 
Economic Insecurity through Americans’ Eyes
Insecurity has become a dominant motif in Americans’ economic lives. 
Strikingly, however, no regularly funded national survey tracks even a small 
share of the factors that shape Americans’ economic security.18 Drawing on a 
unique two-wave survey that comprehensively examines these factors during 
the recession (and allows comparison back to 2007), this report has painted a 
broad portrait of how Americans perceive their economic security.
This portrait shows that Americans are standing on 
shaky ground. During the recent downturn, few have 
not been touched by economic uncertainties. Yet even 
before the recession, more than half of all Americans 
expressed worries about their economic prospects. 
As economic shocks have multiplied and instability 
persisted, these worries have transformed into 
broader and more persistent anxiety driven by  
the widespread experience of economic loss. 
To be sure, these shocks are not felt equally. 
Americans differ in their exposure to economic 
instability and, even more starkly, in their capacity 
to cope with it. Less advantaged Americans and 
racial and ethnic minorities look substantially more 
vulnerable to economic shocks than do Americans as a whole—primarily 
because their basic economic buffers are so weak. Households with children 
appear more deeply affected, perhaps because the adults in these households 
have less flexibility to adapt to changing economic circumstances. 
Yet economic uncertainties touch even those who are relatively well-off: 
About half of households with between $60,000 and $100,000 in annual income 
who experienced persisting shocks to employment or medical costs reported 
some unmet basic needs; almost 40 percent reported multiple unmet needs.  
Altogether, somewhere between a quarter and a third of all Americans reported 
unmet needs associated with economic shocks. 
While less advantaged 
Americans and racial 
and ethnic minorities 
look substantially more 
vulnerable to economic 
shocks, economic 
uncertainties touch even 
those who are relatively 
well-off.
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The SERPI assessed Americans’ experiences and perceptions of economic 
insecurity in the depths of the recession, which might lead to the concern that 
its findings are highly time-bound. Yet, as Figure 13 indicates, general poll data 
suggest that 2009 was not particularly unusual.19 
Worries about job loss did jump in 2009. By the summer of 2010, however, these 
concerns had abated only modestly. The increase in reported worries during 
the downturn was surprisingly modest for housing stability, in part because 
Americans’ concerns were already high; nor did they decline much after 2009. 
For wealth (adequate retirement savings) and medical costs, concerns were 
high even before 2009 and have not diminished since. Americans have been 
standing on shaky ground for some time, and the ground still seems extremely 
unstable.
Whether the ground on which Americans stand is more stable in the future 
depends not just on the pace of economic recovery, but also on whether we 
learn from their longstanding experiences with economic insecurity and work 
to reduce its frequency, severity, and impact in the future. 
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Technical Appendix
This appendix describes in more detail the Survey of Economic Risk 
Perceptions and Insecurity.
The  SERPI was incorporated as a part of the 2008-2009 Panel Survey of the 
American National Election Studies (ANES), a survey funded by the National 
Science Foundation for the past half century. The Panel Survey was an on-line 
survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans who agreed to be 
interviewed monthly between January 2008 and October 2009. Thirteen of the 
monthly waves were available to other researchers. With financial support from 
the Rockefeller Foundation, the SERPI was fielded as the sole questions for the 
panel in March (Wave 15) and September (Wave 21) of 2009.
The ANES panel was constructed to provide a representative sample of the 
American population aged 18 and older as of November 4, 2008. Although not 
all eligible panelists completed the two waves involved in the SERPI, all the 
results reported below are weighted to replicate a nationally representative 
distribution of respondents. Data collected on economic experiences, 
perceptions, and expectations during these two waves were merged with socio-
demographic and other personal characteristics collected from respondents  
in other waves of the ANES survey.
Measures of Economic Insecurity
To accurately assess the prevalence and consequences of insecurity, it was 
essential to measure insecurity in a more complete manner than had been done 
previously. At the same time, the SERPI was designed to allow comparison 
of perceptions of insecurity measured prior to the economic downturn. In 
the spring of 2007, the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored a survey under the 
auspices of its New American Worker initiative that asked three thousand 
Americans about their economic security. The core of this survey was a 
question about “your family’s economic security” defined for respondents as 
“being able to keep your job, maintain your income, have health insurance 
coverage, and retire comfortably.” The survey also asked about concerns 
related to more specific economic risks, including losing one’s job, facing large 
out-of-pocket medical spending, and lacking adequate income to pay for a 
comfortable and secure retirement. 
To allow comparisons with this 2007 survey, the two waves of the SERPI 
incorporated an identically worded set of questions about economic security 
in general, as well as about some of the more specific forms of economic 
risks asked about in the 2007 survey.20 However, the SERPI substantially 
augmented these earlier questions. In the employment domain, the expanded 
scope included questions about (1) losing one’s job (if currently employed), (2) 
finding a job (if currently unemployed but still in the workforce), and (3) losing 
several months from work due to serious illness. In the health domain, the 
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risks included (1) large out-of-pocket medical expenses, (2) losing insurance 
coverage due to cost increases, (3) having coverage cut, (4)  being unable to 
determine what types of services were actually covered, and (5) future nursing 
home costs. In the wealth domain, risks included (1) inadequate savings to 
support an adequate retirement, (2) being unable to cover the costs of current 
housing arrangements, (3) cuts in pension benefits, and (4) having debt so 
large that it could never be paid off. Risks in the family domain included (1) 
urgent financial assistance to members of one’s extended family, (2) losing one’s 
partner/spouse due to divorce, and (3) losing one’s partner/spouse due to death. 
To ensure comparability across surveys, the same response scale was used 
as in the 2007 American Worker survey: respondents were asked if they were 
very, fairly, somewhat, or not at all worried about each risk. Although framing 
responses in terms of “worry” may mean that some respondents will be more 
willing than others to express their concerns, past studies suggest that worry is 
a reliable measure of concerns involving uncertain prospects.21
To assess the frequency with which these worries were realized, a matched 
set of questions were asked about whether respondents had experienced the 
corresponding unexpected events. For example, worries about employment 
correspond with questions regarding whether any adults in the household had 
lost their job. These negative events are described collectively in the report 
as economic “shocks.” Respondents on the March 2009 SERPI were asked 
about whether they had experienced specific shocks in the past year, those 
responding on the September 2009 wave were asked if they had experienced 
specific shocks in the past six months. For those completing both waves of 
the survey, it is therefore possible to construct an 18-month history of their 
experiences, ranging from March 2008 to September 2009.  
Specifically, respondents were asked about two shocks in the employment 
domain (whether any worker in the household had “been unemployed not by 
personal choice” or had “lost more than a month from work due to serious illness 
or injury”), four shocks related to medical expenses (whether they had “lost their 
health insurance,” “had problems getting their insurance to pay for major medical 
expenses,” “had out-of-pocket major medical expenses as the result of serious 
illness or injury in their immediate family,” or “had to pay a lot more for their health 
insurance than expected”), three shocks related to wealth (“had their retirement 
benefits at work cut substantially,” “had the value of their investments or retirement 
funds decline substantially,” or “had the value of their house  decline substantially”) 
and three shocks related to family (whether they had “spent a substantial sum 
helping out their extended family,” “been divorced or separated from their spouse,” 
or “had their spouse/partner pass away”). 
Past research suggests that particular risks will feel more distressing if they 
are relatively hard to anticipate or expected to have a relatively large impact 
on household well-being.22 As part of the SERPI, respondents were asked, for a 
subset of economic risks, to assess whether the events in question were “ones 
that people can plan for, ones that come unexpectedly, or a mix of predictable 
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and unpredictable circumstances?” 23 And if those unfortunate events came 
to pass, how long it might be, “for the typical person like yourself, before the 
household’s financial situation returns to how it was before the event occurred.” 
Buffers against Economic Risks
The extent to which economic uncertainty feels threatening depends in large 
part on a household’s capacity to buffer financial shocks should they occur.  
This in turn depends on the household’s savings and ability to tap into the equity 
of its illiquid assets, balanced against the carrying costs for the household’s 
debt.24 Beyond these household resources, risk can also be buffered by drawing 
upon the financial resources inherent in broader family connections and social 
networks.25 
The value of households’ equity is difficult to assess with great reliability; the 
liquidity of these assets is even more difficult to measure. The SERPI therefore 
included indirect, but more readily answered, questions. These included: (1) 
an estimate of how many weeks/months the household could last, without 
hardship, if its current earnings vanished, (2) whether it had recently tapped 
into the equity of retirement accounts in order to pay expenses, and (3) whether 
the household had accumulated debt so substantial that the respondent 
anticipated difficulty in being able to pay it off. To assess the availability of 
financial resources through social networks, respondents were asked how 
much they could borrow from “family members and close friends” in a time of 
need.
Consequences of Economic Insecurity
High levels of insecurity may be consequential either because they cause 
distress or because they interfere with households’ ability to meet other 
basic needs. The SERPI measured distress through a combination of 
questions regarding how frequently respondents reported thinking about 
their households’ economic insecurity and the extent of anxiety that they 
experienced when they did so. The SERPI measured households’ ability to meet 
basic needs through a combination of questions regarding food security (had 
members of the household gone hungry because there was not enough money 
to pay for groceries), housing instability (losing one’s home through eviction 
or inability to pay the mortgage), and unmet medical needs (not going to the 
doctor for a known problem out of concern for costs). 
Unlike the measures of psychological distress, which are directly attributed 
by respondents to perceptions of economic insecurity, these measures of 
unmet basic needs do not require households to attribute unmet needs to 
specific causes. To assess their relationship with insecurity, therefore, requires 
comparing unmet needs for households that report higher and lower levels 
of perceived insecurity or experienced instability but that otherwise look 
similar. In the text, this is done through comparison of households in similar 
demographic groups (for example, the third income quartile). To ensure that 
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the higher levels of unmet need that are associated with reported economic 
instability were not in fact a consequence of some other factor that occurred 
in conjunction with economic instability, a set of multivariate regression 
models that identified the association of unmet needs and economic shocks 
was estimated. These models controlled statistically for the household’s annual 
income in the year prior to the economic shocks; the value of its stock holdings; 
household size, race and ethnicity; the educational attainment of the primary 
respondent on the survey; and gender and age. 
The results from these models revealed that while instability in all four 
economic domains was associated with higher levels of unmet need for the 
household, only for shocks associated with employment and medical expenses 
was this relationship statistically significant, controlling for shocks in other 
domains and the above-mentioned socio-economic characteristics of the 
household. Conversely, all four buffers were associated with unmet needs in a 
statistically significant manner, again controlling for the presence of economic 
shocks and other socio-economic characteristics of the household. The 
probability of unmet need was about half as large for persisting employment 
shocks, compared with those that occurred but once in the previous 18 months; 
for persisting shocks associated with medical expenses, the probability of 
unmet need was twice as high as for non-reoccurring shocks. 
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